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REVISION OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER: 
A STUDY OF VARIO US APPROACHES 
Richard F. Scott* 
I. The Problem De-fined 
,\_LTHOUGH the United Nations Charter has survived rigorous tests 
.L""l-of practice and application, all will doubtless agree that it should 
now undergo careful review if not thorough revision. Review in 
moderate terms is a matter of continuous international process, the 
Charter's structures and rules being regularly applied to the situa-
tions of everyday international life. As the necessary precondition 
to revision, however, the Charter will be subjected to a more de-
liberate, systematic, and searching review before concrete proposals 
for revision reach a competent international authority. Thus review 
is at once exploratory and promising. But revision is much more. 
Charter revision suggests a host of problems combining political 
and legal elements. Here the political aspects may not be entirely 
distilled from the legal for purposes of study in terms of political 
doctrine and technique. Nor do the legal aspects of revision prob-
lems separate themselves for lawyerlike analysis. Law interweaves 
with politics to confront lawyer and policymaker alike with mixed 
problems of technique in the sphere of international operations. Prob-
ably the larger problem is one of change and accommodation following 
from the expectation that the law should register more precisely the 
recognized changes in international life since the Charter's adoption. 
A widened sense of world community may permit or even demand 
a broader concept of regulation. Or divisive forces at work since the 
inception of the United Nations may seek reflection in a narrower, 
more contracted sphere for international control of politics through 
formal organization. In either case, proposals to modify the Charter 
center upon a notion of changing law, in this instance the basic law 
of the world community. Put thus in its proper context, Charter 
revision becomes more simply a problem of legal change. It would 
accordingly seem to presuppose a critical reexamination of alterna-
tive legal techniques made available by international law for the pur-
pose of effecting changes in existing international legal relations. 
Assuming prior political determination of the substantive matters 
to be modified, and given the existence of a range of available tech-
* Member, California Bar.-Ed. 
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niques, the ultimate choice of legal technique is conditioned by a 
number of political factors. In particular, any proposal emanating 
from the United States will be significantly affected by domestic poli-
tics and public opinion. International politics may likewise control 
the ultimate results of the revision process. The use of particular 
legal devices, independent of substantive proposals, may carry pro-
hibitive, or at least conditioning, political implications. The Charter 
revisionist thus confronts a complicated problem. He must decide 
upon substantive changes, and choose devices which may effectuate 
the desired change. He must then find general domestic and inter-
national support for those changes, and select a legally permissible 
instrumentality with political implications consistent with over-all in-
ternational goals. 
If these are proper or practical limitations on the process of Char-
ter revision, then the extreme approaches to revision may be excluded 
at the outset. One extreme position proposes that the United States 
minimize the sphere of international obligation and maximize the 
area of political free-play by renouncing the Charter entirely.1 To 
this end, proponents of renunciation could rely upon the familiar 
doctrines of rebus sic stantibus,2 prior breach,8 and the alleged right 
1 At various times resolutions calling for withdrawal from the United Nations or 
rescission of the Charter are proposed to the Congress. Some are conditional upon the 
organization failing to follow a given policy. H.J. Res. 463, 82d Cong., 2d sess. (1952); 
S.J. Res. 14, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); H.J. Res. 239, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). 
Others are unconditional and absolute. H. Con. Res. 3, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953); H.R. 
105, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953); H.R. 5080, H.R. 5081, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951); 
H. Con. Res. 166, 82d Cong., 1st sess. (1951). 
2 See THB FREE ZoNEs oP UPPER SAVOY AND nm DxsTRicr OP Gnx, P.C.I.J.; Ser. 
NB, No. 46, at 96, 158; 2 HUDSON, WoRLD Cotm'I' REPORTS 448, 555 (1932); Opinion 
on the International Load Line Convention, 40 OP. ATTY. GEN. 119 (1941). Interna-
tional practice bearing on the doctrine rebus sic stantibus is collected in Harvard Draft 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. IN-r. L. SUPP. 655 at 1096 (1935); 5 
fuCKwoRTH, DxcnsT OP lNrBRNATIONAL LAw §511, p. 349 (1943); 5 MooRE, DxcBS'l' 
OP lNrBRNATIONAL LAw §772 (1908); Hill, "The Doctrine of Rebus Sic Stantibus in 
International Law," UNIV. oP Mxssoum STaoms, IX, No. 3 (193~); McNAIR, THB I.Aw 
oP TRBATms 376 (1938); 2 HYDE, lNrBBNATIONAL LAw CHIEFLY AS lNrBRPRETED AND 
APPLil!D BY nm UNITED STATES, 2d ed., pp. 1523-1541 (1945). For a recent controversy 
see Briggs; "Rebus Sic Stantibus before the Security Council: the Anglo-Egyptian Ques-
tion," 43 AM. J. IN-r. L. 762 (1949). Included in the Economic :Aid Agreement with 
Spain is an express clause adopting rebus sic stantibus for that agreeement. See Article 
X(2) of the Economic Aid Agreement, Agreements Concluded with Spain, 29 DEP'l'. op 
S'I'ATE BuL. 435, 436, 439 (1953). 
3 See Harvard Draft Convention on Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. IN-r. L. SUPP. 655 at 
1077-1096 (1935), for a collection of the practice and authorities. Article 27(a) of the 
Draft, provides: "If a state fails to carry out in good faith its obligations under a treaty, 
any other party to the treaty, acting in a reasonable time after the failure, may seek from a 
competent international tribunal or authority a declaration to the effect that the treaty has 
ceased to be binding upon it in the sense of calling for further performance with respect 
to such state." Soviet violations of the Charter are cliscussed in Acheson, "Progress Toward 
International Peace and Unity," 26 DEP'l', oP STATE Bm.. 647 (1952); Acheson, "The 
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of unilateral withdrawal from international organizations.4 But even 
if the law of nations permits application of these principles against 
the Charter;' legal considerations in this area would doubtless yield 
to the overwhelming impact of political implications. Neither Am-
erican0 nor international opinion generally7 presently supports renun-
ciation of the Charter, and renunciation would lead only to a general 
Peace the World Wants," 23 DEPT. OP STATE BuL, 523 (1950); Austin, "The Problem 
of Voting in the Security Council," 20 DEPT. OP STATE BuL. 512 (1949). The prolonged 
absence of the USSR from the United Nations organs during 1950 can be construed as a 
violation of art. 28(1). See Austin, ''Review of Security Council Action in Defense of 
Korea," 23 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 451 (1950). Other Soviet violations associated with the 
Korea action are discussed in SEctllllTY CotJNCIL OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th Year, No. 37 
at 5 (1950). The effect of the violations for prior breach purposes, however, is vitiated 
by Charter remedies. See articles 5, 6, 10, 11, 12, 39; GoonruCH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER 
OP nm UNITED NATIONS, 2d ed., 138, 140 (1949); KELsEN, THE LAw OP nm UNITED 
NATIONS 712, 714, 732 (1950). 
4 With respect to the right of withdrawal, Committee I/2 of the San Francisco 
Conference used the following language: "If ••. a Member because of exceptional circum-
stances feels constrained to withdraw, and leave the burden of maintaining international 
peace and security on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization to com-
pel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organization." Report of Rapporteur 
of Committee I/2, as amended, 7 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 324 at 328 (1945). This report was 
approved in plenary session of the Conference, 1 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 620 (1945). For a 
view that this action of the Conference was of no legal significance see KELsEN, THB LAw 
OP nm UNITED NATIONS 127 (1950). But the American delegate in Committee I/2 
maintained that "in an organization of sovereign states it was clear that all members would 
possess the faculty of withdrawal •••• " 7 U.N. CoNP. Doc. 262 at 265 (1945). U.N. 
Charter, art. 2(1), provides: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of all its Members." Cf. KELsEN, THE LAw oP nm UNITED NATIONS 125 (1950). 
5 But general international law conditions lawful withdrawal' from treaties upon con-
sent of all parties, a necessary implication of the rule pacta sunt servmu1a. See Harvard 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM. J. INT. L. SUPP. 655 at 661 and 977 
(1935), art. 20 entitled "Pacta Sunt Servanda." As applied to such a basic question as 
renunciation or withdrawal, the contention that general international law is superior to the 
Charter has raised some controversy. While the concept "international law" is mentioned 
in articles 1 and 13, the Charter does not expressly accept its superiority or subordination 
to general international law. But the Charter is doubtless superior where its express lan-
guage modifies previous rules of the law of nations. U.N. Charter, art. 103. See Verdross, 
"The Charter of the United Nations and General International Law," in LAw AND Pou-
TICS IN THI! WoRLD CoMMUNlTY, Lipsky ed., 153 (1953); Wright, The Outlawry of 
War and the Law of War," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 365, 372 (1953); Taubenfeld, "Interna-
tional Actions and Neutrality," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 377, 384 et seq. (1953). But the 
Charter probably continues to rely on the general international law of treaties for support 
on technical matters, although even this need not be true if progressive development 
requires a different principle. Cf. Kunz, "General International Law and the Law of Inter-
national Organizations," 47 AM. J. INT. L. 456 (1953). 
6 See generally, Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Re-
view of the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. 10-11, 72, 104, 110, 149 (1954) 
[hereinafter cited Hearings (1954)]; Eisenhower, "Proclaiming Our Faith Anew," 28 
DEPT. OP STATE BUL. 167 (1953); Truman, "U.S. Foreign Policy in Review," 28 DEPT. 
OP STATE BUL. 43 (1953); Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 
81st Cong., 2d sess. (1950) •. 
7 The United Nations Members' views on Charter revision generally are collected in 
GENERAL AssBMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 8th sess., Sixth Committee 55-105 (1953); 
"Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 446 (1953). 
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loss in the integrity of all international agreements. Under these 
circumstances, the renunciation technique fails to meet the minimum 
requirements of a workable alternative approach. 
Similar problems would combine to frustrate proposals tending 
toward the other extreme of radical extension of United Nations com-
petence. By forcing a "revolutionary displacement''8 of the United 
Nations, it is conceivable that a Charter revision conference could 
turn itself into a constitutional convention and produce a draft world 
constitution or a Charter revised to exclude the Soviet Union. Given 
the backing of de facto power, such a revolution would probably be 
legal if effectively established,9 but political objections to world gov-
ernment10 or exclusion of the USSR11 would be decisive. Thus the 
process of "revolutionary displacement" exists as a legal possibility, 
8 ''Revolutionary displacement" takes place when one regime effectively replaces 
another by illegal methods. De facto power then combines with legal color of the new 
regime to overcome any inconsistency with the old. Should a member of the United 
Nations enter any agreement inconsistent with the Charter, article 103 provides that the 
Charter shall prevail. Since the schemes for world government or exclusion of the USSR 
would probably violate the Charter, they would constitute "revolutionary displacements" 
if effective. 
9 While analytical theorists may dispute extensions of Professor Kelsen's doctrine of 
"effectiveness" as a necessary condition to the validity of a particular rule of law [:KELSEN, 
GENERAL THEORY OF LAW AND THE STATE 117 et seq. (1949); KELsEN, PRINCIPLES oF 
INTERNATIONAL LAw 214, 289, 412 (1952); Tucker, "The Principle of Effectiveness in 
International Law" in LAw AND PoLITics IN THE WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 31 
(1953); Morgenthau, "Positivism, Functionalism, and International.Law," 34 AM.. J. INT. 
L. 260 (1940)], there seems to be general agreement that effective displacement of the 
basic structure of legal institutions results in a new and valid regime. See authorities, 
supra; Kunz, ''Revolutionary Creation of Norms of International Law," 41 AM. J. INT. L. 
119 (1947); Verdross, "The Charter of the United Nations and General International 
Law,'' in LAw AND PoLITics IN THE WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 154 (1953); 
White, "How to Amend the United Nations Charter," 37 A.B.A.J. 431 (1951). 
10 Support for world government proposals is presently insufficient to permit consid-
eration as reasonable substantive possibilities. See Hearings (1954) at 79, 107, 114, 134 
for specific statements relating to world government. In 1950 the Department of State 
took a position clearly contrary to world government proposals. See Hearings before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Revision of the United Nations Charter, 81st 
Cong., 2d sess. 398, 408, 410, 427, 428, 438 (1950) [hereinafter cited Hearings (1950)]; 
Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 29, 30, 47 
(1950). If the view of the executive branch is thus contrary, the legislative is one of patent 
hostility. Sec. 110 of the Department of State Appropriation Act, 1954, provides: "None 
of the funds appropriated in this title shall be used (1) to pay the United States contn'bu-
tion to any international organization which engages in the direct or indirect promotion 
of the principle or doctrine of one world government or one world citizenship; (2) for the 
promotion, direct or indirect, of the principle or doctrine of one world government or one 
world citizenship." 67 Stat. L. 367 at 372 (1953). Identical provision was made in the 
appropriation for 1953. 66 Stat. L. 549 at 556 (1952). 
11 Thus spokesmen for the Department of State have consistently supported the view 
that advantage lies with the policy keeping the Soviets within the organization. See 
Hearings (1950); Dulles, in Hearings (1954) at 10-11, 23, 25, and for general views, at 
41-42, 68, 79, 80, 84, 88, 104, 105, 115. 
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but as a practical matter it seems to ignore the familiar dictum that 
"politics is the art of the possible." 
Thus departing from both extremes of renunciation and revolu-
tionary displacement, it remains to examine the less extensive but 
more workable devices which may be used to perfect changes within 
the existing United Nations framework. For this purpose, the formal 
amendment is important primarily for its popular currency, the tech-
niques of "subordinate consistent agreement" and "interpretation and 
practice" for their feasibility. Because these three legal tools have 
individual constellations of implications, each will be considered sep-
arately with the substantive proposals dependent upon its function 
and application. 
II. The Possibilities of Revision by Formal Amendment 
Current proposals to modify the United Nations Charter tend to 
center upon the formal amendment process. This procedure has 
always been permitted by general international law, ordinarily through 
the routine substitution of a new agreement for the old. To effect 
such a change, a corollary of pacta sunt servanda requires unanimous 
participation or consent.12 That is to say, one treaty could not re-
place a prior inconsistent treaty without consent of all the parties. 
Any lesser doctrine would destroy the rule that treaty obligations 
must be carried out in good faith. However accepted the unanimous 
consent rule may be, nothing precludes signatories from waiving in 
advance their right to insist that a treaty otherwise valid and sub-
sisting remain executory until each party consents to a change. This 
is the case with the United Nations Charter. 
Chapter XVIII of the Charter spells out two distinct procedures 
for adoption of formal amendments. Like the Constitution of the 
United States, the Charter separates the procedures of proposal and 
ratification required to perfect an amendment. Article I 08 provides 
for the proposal of amendments by the General Assembly. At this 
stage a mere two-thirds majority vote in the Assembly is required. 
Since the Security Council's participation is unnecessary, no veto 
power threatens this procedure. The second proposal procedure en-
12 Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AM.. J. INT. L. SUPP. 655 
at 661 and 977 (1935). Art. 20, entitled "Pacta Sunt Servanda," provides: "A state is 
bound to carry out in good faith the obligations which it has assumed by a treaty (pacta 
sunt servanda)." 1£ a subsequent agreement were permitted to modify the Charter without 
consent of all signatories, its binding effect would be lost. See U.N. Charter, art. 103. 
Application of general international law to the Charter is discussed in note 5 supra. 
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visages the use of a general conference independent of the United 
Nations. By a vote of two-thirds of the Assembly, any seven mem-
bers of the Security Council concurring, a general conference for 
review of the Charter may be held at any time. Anticipating the 
possible disuse of the conference method, the framers of the Charter 
provided a special procedure to be followed by the Assembly at its 
tenth annual session. If, at the time the tenth General Assembly 
convenes, there has been no general conference for revision, the Char-
ter requires that the agenda of that Assembly contain a proposal to 
call the conference. This does not, of course, require the calling of 
a conference; it merely ensures that the conference device will be 
seriously considered. Under this provision instead of a two-thirds 
vote of the Assembly, a mere majority-thirty-one votes-is required 
to call the conference. In either case the Security Council must con-
cur by a vote of any seven of its members, but this is a matter not 
within the veto power of the permanent members. Once established 
by either procedure, the conference proposes amendments by a two-
thirds majority, each member of the United Nations having one vote, 
none retaining the power to veto proposals of specific amendments. 
In short, the proposal process, whether utilized by the General As-
sembly or the conference, requires a mere two-thirds vote. No sep-
arate action is required by the Security Council; no veto power exists 
at this stage. 
If the proposal procedure thus outlined offers promise of success, 
the ratification procedure offers promise of much less. Whether pro-
posed by the Assembly or conference procedure, the ratification re-
quirements are identical in each case. Chapter XVIII requires that 
amendments be ratified in accordance with their constitutional pro-
cesses by two-thirds of the members of the United Nations, including 
all the permanent members of the Security Council. Hence proposed 
amendments may fail to come into force by ~issent of either the 
United States, United Kingdom, France, China, or the Soviet Union. 
Even this assumes that two-thirds of the membership will ratify the 
proposed amendments. Such being the case, one may venture to 
suggest that the proposal of amendments by Assembly or conference 
looms large as a real possibility, but the sufficient number of ratifica-
tions in all likelihood failing, the actual coming into force of amend-
ments is at best extremely unlikely. The political significance and 
attendant dangers of proposal without subsequent ratification is con-
sidered below in a different connection. 
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Current interest in Charter amendment revolves around the con-
ference device. The tenth Assembly meets in the fall of 1955. By 
a majority of thirty-one votes that Assembly may, and best guesses 
predict it will, call a general conference to be held in 1956 or 1957. 
Preparatory work setting up the preliminary foundations for such a 
conference is already well under way in the United Nations13 and 
the United States.14 As early as November 1953 the great majority 
of United Nations members evidenced support for calling the general 
conference.15 
Granting the probability that the conference will be convened, 
concrete proposals for revision assume considerable importance. Many 
such proposals have been suggested since the United Nations began 
to function. As the time for the conference approaches, however, at 
this very early stage, governments have taken generally a cautious 
attitude. Outspoken proposals by United Nations members are now 
conspicuous by their absence. In November 1953, when the As-
sembly's legal committee met to suggest certain preparatory activity, 
only a few governments used that opportunity to express support for 
concrete proposals. The representatives of Panama and Nicaragua de-
clared their acceptance of a proposal to eliminate the veto in member-
ship matters.16 Nicaragua further suggested the need to remedy in-
ternational problems arising out of atomic energy and self-determina-
tion of peoples developments.17 Other governments were generally 
13 On November 28, 1953 the General Assembly passed by a vote of 54-5 a resolution 
initiating preparatory work. U.N. Doc. NResolution/133, Nov. 28, 1953. See GENBRAL 
AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 8th sess., Sixth Committee 55-105 (1953); Liang, 
"Preparatory Work for a Possible Revision of the United Nations Charter," 48 AM. J. 
htt. L. 83 (1954); Byrnes, "Preparatory Work to Begin on Review of U.N. Charter," 29 
DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 908, 909 (1953); "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at 
San Francisco," 15 U.N. Bm.. 446 (1953). The Legal Committee of the Assembly 
decided not to solicit views on substantive proposals at this early date, but supported 48-5 
the resolution as finally passed by the Assembly, id. at 495. The resolution requests the 
Secretary General to prepare and publish a systematic compilation of unpublished San 
Francisco documents, a complete index of the documents of that Conference, and a reper-
tory of the practice of the United Nations organs appropriately indexed. 
14 During July 1953, the Senate authorized the creation of a Senate Foreign Relations 
Subcommittee to make a full study of proposals to amend or otherwise modify existing 
international peace and security organizations. S. Res. 126, 83d Cong., 1st sess. (1953), 
as amended by S. Res. 193, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); "Review of U.N. Charter," 29 
DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 310 (1953); "Revision of U.N. Charter," id. at 343; Hearings 
(1954). 
15 See authorities collected in note 13 supra. 
16 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BuL. 446, 
449, 493 (1953). 
11 Id. at 493. 
46 MicmGAN LAw REvmw [ Vol. 53 
noncommittal.18 A generally favorable attitude was expressed by the 
United States representative, Mr. Byrnes, who emphasized the im-
portance of " ... utilizing the full opportunity this presents in its 
[the United Nations'] quest for a peaceful world order under 
law .... 19 Secretary Dulles had adverted to revision in similarly gen-
eral language at the August 1953 American Bar Association meeting,20 
though several weeks earlier he thought it was timely to state that 
the "Department [of State] will favor the calling of the review con-
ference when the question is put to the 1955 session of the United 
Nations General Assembly."21 At that time Secretary Dulles con-
tinued to believe "that final United States policies on this question 
must await full public discussion of the issues as well as consulta-
tions with members of Congress,"22 thus reaffirming earlier statements 
stressing the importance of wide participation in preparation.23 Con-
gressional interest is indicated by authorization of a Senate Foreign 
Relations Subcommittee to study proposals to amend, revise, or other-
wise modify international peace and security organizations.24 On 
January 18, 1954, Mr. Dulles appeared before this Subcommittee to 
state for the first time the State Department's views on specific areas 
for possible reform. These included removal of the veto from mem-
bership and pacific settlement matters, a new approach to disarma-
ment problems, and a procedure for settling credentials disputes. He 
questioned, moreover, the adequacy of Charter provisions dealing with 
the General Assembly voting and the role of international law in 
United Nations affairs.211 Nevertheless, the Department's attitude 
remains cautious and noncommittal, Mr. Dulles asking to be excused 
qom categorical answers to detailed questions on possible changes. 
18 Other opinions were expressed in the General Assembly meeting in plenary session 
during September 1953. See excerpts reproduced in REVIllw OF THB UNITED NATIONS 
CHARTER (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess. No. 87 at 779-816 (1954). Suggestions 
tending to support revision of the veto power were made by Peru, id. at 782, Ecuador, id. 
at 787, Dominican Republic, id. at 795, Iceland, id. at 795, and Lebanon, id. at 804. Re-
vision of the present formula for Security Council representation was suggested by Syria, id. 
at 797, revision of the non-self-governing territories provisions by France, id. at 798, and 
membership proposals were made by Costa Rica, id. at 801. 
19 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 446, 
449 (1953). 
20 Dulles, "U.S. Constitution and U.N. Charter: an Appraisal," 29 DEPT. OF STATE 
BaL. 307 at 310, 343 (1953). 
21 Dulles, "Review of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. oF STATE BUL. 310 at 311 (1953); 
REVIllw OF THB U.N. CHARTER (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess., No. 87 at 779 (1954). 
22 Dulles, ''Review of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 310 at 311 (1953). 
23 Dulles, ''Revision of the U.N. Charter," 29 DEPT. OF STATE BaL. 343 (1953). 
24 Supra note 14. 
25 Hearings (1954) at 4-34. 
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Other views expressed in the United Nations favorable to the con-
ference suggested the possibility of revision activity recreating an at-
mosphere which would lead to the discovery of new avenues of co-
operation26 or at least showing how the charter has been misinter-
preted and abused in practice. 27 Members opposed to extensive and 
radical change were few in number. Only Afganistan, Yugoslavia, 
Sweden, and Peru28 expressed such views, which, if maintained, 
would not necessarily preclude changes of a minor character. 
Most consistently opposed to steps even preliminary to a general 
conference were representatives of the Soviet bloc. They refused to 
admit the constitutionality of preliminary work and expressed the 
strongest opposition to suggested proposals of a substantive character. 
Indicating a threat of Soviet veto against proposals submitted to rati-
fication, the Czech delegate adverted to the "inviolability of the Char-
ter."29 Similarly, reference was made to the conformity of the veto 
power with "international law," implying perhaps that Soviet spokes-
men elevate to an "inalienable right" the voting procedure presently 
established in the Charter.30 In any case these and other31 state-
ments referring to the revision concept as an aggressive device likely 
to do great damage to the organization offer ample evidence from 
which the only reasonable conclusion is that any amendments pro-
posed by the general conference may expect failure of ratification by 
the USSR.32 This being true, grave doubts exist regarding the utility 
of the amendment process. 
What remains then as favorable in the formal amendment ap-
proach from the standpoint of the United Nations development and 
American foreign policy? Having shown that the conference will 
probably be held, and the conference may adopt resolutions without 
the veto problem, the key question goes to the utility of having such 
26 "Documentation of All Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BUL. 449 
(1953). 
27Ibid. 
28 Jd. at 448, 449. 
29 Id. at 448. 
SO Ibid. 
81 Ibid; Mr. Vyshinsky's statement before the General Assembly, Sept. 21, 1953, 
REvmw oF nm llNI'l'l!D NATIONS CHARTHR (Documents), 83d Cong., 2d sess., No. 87 at 
780 (1954). 
82 Jn his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee, Ambassador Lodge made clear 
his belief that the Soviets would veto any amendments proposed by the West. Hearings 
(1954) at 42, 44. But Secretary Dulles was more optimistic when he said, "We can 
reasonably make our plans on the working hypothesis that no one nation will, in fact, be 
able arbitrarily either to impose changes or to veto changes," id. at 9, and " ••• I am not 
discouraged at all at the possibilities of having some changes here, if they seem reasonable 
and if they have a strong backing from world opinion." Id. at 23. 
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proposed amendments put to the membership knowing they will not 
come into force. Assuming that such amendments would not be 
forced into acceptance against the will of the USSR,33 two possible 
rhetorical advantages suggest themselves for analysis. 
The first rhetorical advantage of the amendment process would 
be an increase in activity and serious thought about United Nations 
affairs. 34 Preliminary work is already producing intense activity and 
a new literature on the United Nations will doubtless appear as the 
Charter revision conference approaches. Increased thought and ac-
tivity emphasizing the idea and symbolism of the United Nations 
would tend to increase the broad basis of support for the United 
Nations and the principle of international cooperation. If public 
opinion works a decisive inB.uence on the conduct of foreign relations, 
a broader base of thought sympathetic to the United Nations con-
cept may facilitate more extensive reliance upon United Nations pro-
cedures by the member governments. This in turn, through a cyclical 
effect, conduces independently to further support for international 
cooperation and collective security. Law and community interacting 
in a primitive organizational context gradually lay the basis for a 
stable international society of nations amenable to a regime of law.35 
If it is possible to say that movements furthering these developments 
support the purposes of the United Nations, and these ar~ "interests" 
of the United Nations, then it can be argued that rhetorical use of 
the amendment process conduces to the interests of world organiza-
tion. If this were the only effect of rhetorical usage, where the 
amendments are expected to fail of ratification, the entire procedure 
would not be objectionable from the standpoint of the United Na-
tions interests. 
But these assumptions neglect the second and more questionable 
rhetorical use of the revision process. It was the Panamanian dele-
gate to the General Assembly who adverted to the amendment pro-
cedure as a means of showing abuse of the Charter.3·6 The danger 
33 See note 11 supra. 
34 Thus at the outset of the Senate Subcommittee's 1954 Hearings, Senator Wiley, 
after noting that there is a veto problem, further observed: "What we can do during this 
study is to understand more fully what is involved in our present participation in the United 
Nations and determine what changes, if any, we want to bring about and will work to 
bring about with respect to this organization." Hearings (1954) at 3; Dulles, id. at 24. 
35 Wright, ''Law and Politics in the World Community," in LAw AND Pou:ncs IN 
nm WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 3 at 13 (1953). 
36 ''Documentation of all Charter Proceedings at San Francisco," 15 U.N. BuL. 449 
(1953). 
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lies in the great powers actually using it for that purpose.37 To the 
end of furthering the world power position of the United States, it 
seems possible for the United States to push proposals through the 
conference by the necessary two-thirds vote, and then use the ratifica-
tion campaign as a power and rhetorical device to further discredit 
and isolate the USSR. Dressed in appropriate ideological language, 
the ratification campaign could probably lower the prestige of the 
USSR by compelling it to "veto" amendments generally acceptable 
to the United Nations membership but untenable to the USSR. At 
best this would result in minimum advantage to the United States. 
At worst it may induce the Soviets to withdraw further from active 
participation in the organization's affairs. Surely the failure of rati-
fication would result in the further frustration, not the realization, 
of United Nations interests. The decision to use or not to use the 
ratification campaign for power purposes thus turns on a necessary 
and careful balancing of interests. When the considerations going 
against the rhetorical use are supplemented by its tendency to dis-
courage a sound basis of organizational development through inter-
pretation and practice, the balance weighs heavily against use of the 
formal amendment procedure to effect change. 
III. Effective Revision of the Charter by Subordinate 
Consistent Agreement 
A frequently used and readily available alternative technique of 
change is the permissible subordinate international agreement.38 Trea-
ties inconsistent with the Charter are clearly controlled by that docu-
ment. 30 Yet a large area for extension of obligation is not foreclosed 
by the United Nations. Generally speaking, members40 may further 
37 For a discussion of various uses of the conference method for Charter revision, see 
Gross, "Revising the Charter," 32 FoREIGN AFFAIRS 203 at 205 (Jan. 1954). Perhaps 
in anticipation of this difficulty, Secretary Dulles observed, ". • • while a charter review 
conference should be welcomed as a means of strengthening the United Nations, difference 
of opinion about how to do this should not then be pressed to a point such that the review 
conference would result in undermining the United Nations or disrupting it. The United 
Nations as it is, is better than no United Nations at all." Hearings (1954) at 9; also 
Lodge, id. at 37. 
38 See Dulles, Hearings (1954) at 11; How the United Nations Has Developed, Staff 
Study No. 2, Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. 12 (1954); 
Engel, ''De Facto Revision of the Charter of the United Nations," 14 J. OF Po=cs 132 
at 139 (1952). 
39 Note 12 supra. 
40 Non-members as well are limited by the Charter in respect to security matters, 
U.N. Charter, art. 2(6), and treaties with members which conflict with the Charter. Art. 
103. Otherwise non-members enjoy an equal right to participate in arrangements con-
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obligate themselves to pursue a course of action even in areas of 
international relations on which the Charter speaks. Thus it is 
assumed that the Charter does not preempt the fields of activity it 
regulates. Since the Charter lays down a minimum body of rules, 
members may re-enter the fields covered by the Charter and use the 
treaty device to secure further restrictions on political discretion. Or 
express rights held under the Charter may be waived by the mem-
bers, so long as this procedure does not constitute a threat to the 
peace. 41 Both techniques are supported by a long line of accepted 
practice of United Nations organs and individual members.42 
At least within the purview of article 51, subordinate collective 
security agreements are doubtless permissible and consistent with the 
Charter. Regional arrangements predicated on subordinate agree-
ments occupy the attention of Chapter VIII of the Charter. In pur-
suance to these provisions the western powers have entered such im-
portant agreements as the Rio Pact,43 the Bogota Charter,44 the North 
Atlantic Pact,45 and the Pacific Security Agreements.46 Some such 
subordinate agreements expressly recognize the legal superiority of 
the Charter.47 In at least one instance, the Bogota Charter, a security 
agreement clearly extends its sphere of obligation beyond the area of 
express Charter authorization, 48 thus suggesting a broader concept of 
compatibility. Military and economic undertakings as recent as the 
sistent with the Charter. Thus Italy and Portugal became signatories to the North Atlantic 
Pact. See Hearings before Committee on Foreign Relations on the North Atlantic Treaty, 
81st Cong., 2d sess., Pt. I at 93 (1949). 
41 At some point, of course, waiver of rights affects the whole community adversely. 
Basic rights affecting peace ought not to be within the waiver power, since the waiver may 
effect a modification of the Charter violating art. 103. If, for example, two or more states 
waive their right to freedom from the use or threat of force found in art. 2(4), then the 
community as a whole suffers if violence follows. This is merely to show that limits to a 
waiver power clearly exist, however illusive the controlling principle may be. 
42 See p. 55 infra. 
43 "Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,'' T.I.A.S. 1838; 17 DEPT. 011 
S'l'ATE BUL. 565 (1947). . 
44 "Charter of the Organization of American States," T.I.A.S. 2361; 46 AM. J. !NT. 
L. SUPP. 43 (1952). 
45 34 U.N.T.S. 243; T.I.A.S. 1964, 63 Stat. L. 2241 (1949). 
46 Pacific Security Agreement, T.I.A.S. 2493; Security Treaty with Japan, T.I.A.S. 
2491 (1952); 25 DEPT. 01' S'l'ATE BUL. 148 (1951). 
47 See art. 10 of the Rio Pact, supra note 43; art. 102 of the Bogota Charter, supra note 
44; art. 7 of the North Atlantic Pact, supra note 45. Cf. Treaty Constituting the European 
Defense Community, arts. 121, 122, Senate Executive Q and R, 82d Cong., 2d sess. 167, 
203 (1952); Draft Treaty Embodying the Statute of the European Community, art. 72 
(1953). 
48 Note 44 supra, art. 25. 
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Spanish-American agreements of 195349 offer continued support to 
the view that members may enlarge upon their Charter obligations. 
Possible use of this technique to expand the obligations of members 
in their direct participation in the United Nations is shown by the 
proposals contained in the famous Thomas-Douglas Resolution of 
1950.50 While this resolution was not successful in the Senate, the 
reasons for its failure were other than legal.51 Without formal amend-
ment of the Charter, the Thomas-Douglas Resolution proposed voting 
changes and implementation in the security structure of the United 
Nations by a "supplementary agreement under article 51 open to all 
members of the United Nations." The supplementary agreement 
would bind its signatories to come to the aid of the victim of attack 
if requested to do so by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, 
including three permanent members of the Security Council. Armed 
forces for implementing the duty to aid the victim of attack would 
be available in the spirit of article 43 of the Charter. The resolution 
accordingly proposed a treaty eliminating the veto and earmarking in 
advance specific military forces to be available to the Security Council 
or General Assembly. To this extent the Thomas-Douglas Resolu-
tion went beyond the Vandenburg Resolution which called for sup-
plementary agreements to remove the veto from pacific settlement 
matters.52 • 
The sound legal basis for the procedure adopted in the Thomas-
Douglas Resolution was forcefully put before the Senate Foreign Re-
lations Subcommittee by Professor Quincy Wright. He argued that 
the Resolution conformed with the principles, purposes, and other 
express provisions of the Charter, practice under the Charter, prac-
tice under the League Covenant, and legal doctrine properly laid down 
by the World Court.58 Consequently, it may be agreed that use of 
subordinate consistent agreements is firmly established as a permis-
sible legal technique for effecting change of existing structures like 
the United Nations.54 
49 See Text of Defense Agreement in Agreements Concluded With Spain, 29 U.S. 
DEPT. OP SrAT.E BDL. 436 (1953); Text of Economic Aid Agreement, ibid.; Text of 
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, id. at 440. 
50 S. Con. Res. 52, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949); Hearings (1950) at 2 et seq.; Re-
vision of United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 25 (1950). 
61 Revision of United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d sess. 27, 47, 
53 (1950). 
52 S. Res. 239, 80th Cong., 2d sess. (1948). 
58 Testimony of Professor Wright, Hearings (1950) at 27 et seq. 
64 Cf. Revision of the United Nations Charter, S. Rep. No. 2501, 81st Cong., 2d 
sess, 27 (1950). 
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Its legal basis once established, the subordinate consistent agree-
ment device opens an avenue of considerable possibility. Changes 
as extensive as the Atlantic Union rely upon this concept.55 Separate 
agreements may be used to effect change in the structure and func-
tion of the United Nations in less ambitious ways already mentioned. 
In fact most, if not all, proponents of formal amendment might first 
rely upon the agreement process as a preliminary testing ground and 
laboratory for experimentation before proceeding to formal amend-
ment of the Charter. Thus conditioned by observation of a change 
on a basis less than universal, intransigent dissenting states might 
eventually be persuaded to participate or at least acquiesce. Un-
trammeled by the veto problem, this procedure provides a means for 
the proponents of change to have their revision while the divisive 
effects of renunciation, revolutionary displacement, and the vetoed 
formal amendment are in the main successfully avoided. In more 
precise terms, use of the subordinate consistent agreement procedure 
may provide the West with desired changes without forever foreclosing 
closer cooperation with the USSR. Any legal device which so nicely 
balances the conllicting demands of progress and stability deserves the 
utmost in attentive exploration. 
IV. Effective Change through Interpretation and Practice 
The :fifth and :final technique of change admissible to the United 
Nations context lacks important incidents of the others already dis-
cussed. Growth and development of an existing structure through 
interpretation and practice, the ancient, conservative, and often diffi-
cult technique lacks the force and drama inherent in renunciation, 
revolutionary displacement, subordinate agreement, and formal amend-
ment. But what the process of interpretation and practice lacks in 
force and drama it gains in reliability and effectiveness. 
Proponents of interpretation and practice as the preferable means 
of change properly assume that the Charter cannot be modified by 
formal amendment. This being the case, it is an easy next step to 
show that the written Charter as presently constituted is the best 
common denominator, the most acceptable statement of interests and 
aspirations of the world community and its member states. Even to 
the probably limited extent to which the USSR can now allow itself 
to participate in the functions of the organization, that minimum par-
ticipation may be preferable to none at all. Some changes being 
55 See testimony of Justice Roberts, Hearings (1950) at 232, 237, 238. 
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desirable notwithstanding minority objection, the gradual method of 
interpretation further assumes that its pragmatic, piecemeal, and some-
times awkward results are more acceptable than no change at all. 
Any progressive change through this technique depends, moreover, 
on a conception that the unamended Charter of 1945 can carry con-
siderably more legal traffic,56 that the Charter, in other words, is suf-
ficiently B.exible to permit extensive internal change without losing 
its character as a regulator of international politics. 
Two theories of interpretation compete to control the last assump-
tion. Like the historical controversy central to interpretation of the 
American Constitution, a concept of liberal versus restrictive inter-
pretation raises controversy relative to the Charter in the international 
sphere. Both have articulate advocates well armed with legal weapons 
to support each view. Reduced to its simplest terms, the restrictive 
view would argue that the United Nations has only that authority 
and competence expressly delegated by the members in the San Fran-
cisco Charter.57 Growth in competence beyond the express grants 
would be possible only through a formal amendment process, not 
through interpretation and practice. On the other hand, the liberal 
view emphasizes the constitutional character of the Charter with the 
organization deriving its powers from express functions and purposes 
56 Thus Secretary Dulles has observed, "The defects in the charter can to a consid-
erable extent be corrected by practices which are permissible under the charter." Hearings 
(1950) at 8. In 1950, Dean Rusk said, " ••• there is no question but that the Charter can 
carry much more traffic if its members desire to have it do so.'' Hearings (1950) at 385. 
The ability of the Charter to grow without formal change depends in part on the ambig-
uity of its constitutive instrument. The controlling work showing this ambiguity is 
KELSEN, THE LAw OF THE UNITED NATIONS (1950). See also, How the United Nations 
Charter Has Developed, Staff Study No. 2, Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations 
Charter, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954); ENGEL, "De Facto Revision of the Charter of the 
United Nations," 14 J. OF POLITICS 132 at 133 (1952). 
57 The Charter seems to add some support to the restrictive view. Art. 2(1), acknowl-
edging that the "Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members," combines with the domestic jurisdiction reservation of art. 2(7) to narrow the 
scope of United Nations authority. Thus grounded by these two provisions on "sovereign 
equality," it can be argued that the members intended to part with only that authority 
expressly granted the United Nations in the Charter. All else is reserved to the sovereign 
members; grants of power in derogation of sovereignty are not to be presumed. Some 
authority for this view is found in International Court of Justice decisions. See dissenting 
opinion of Judge Hackworth, Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United 
Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 174 at 198 (1949): "There can be no gainsaying the fact that the 
Organization is one of delegated and enumerated powers. It is to be presumed that such 
powers as the Member States desire to confer upon it are stated either in the Charter or 
in complementary agreements concluded by them. Powers not expressed cannot be freely 
implied. Implied powers flow from a grant of expressed powers, and are limited to those 
that are 'necessary' to the exercise of the powers expressly granted.'' See also, Competence 
of the General Assembly for Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 
8 (1950). Cf. Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness 
in the Interpretation of Treaties," 26 BmT. Y.B. !Nr. L. 48 (1949). 
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as well as specific grants in its constitutive document. The propon-
ents of liberal construction, accordingly, produce a rule allowing the 
organization such competence necessary to enable it to act in any way 
consistent with its functions and purposes except where the Charter 
expressly prohibits action.68 Considered as technical legal choices be-
tween competing concepts of treaty interpretation, neither restrictive 
nor liberal concepts find universal acceptance in doctrine and prac-
tice. Yet in a context limited to organic treaties such as the United 
Nations Charter, the preponderant authority of international law, in-
cluding the opinion Qf the World Court'9 and international practice, 60 
precludes the restrictive and emphatically supports the liberal view 
as the law of the Charter. 
Taken within the range of its fullest possible impact, the liberal 
view opens the door to far-reaching changes. Developed to their fullest 
potentials, the purposes of maintaining peace and security, developing 
friendly relations among nations, achieving cooperation in economic, 
social, cultural or humanitarian spheres, 61 and establishing conditions 
under which justice and respect for the obligations of international 
law can be maintained, 62 it is not altogether impossible that the United 
58 This approach is variously characterized as "liberal,'' "effective," "functional/' 
"rational," "pmposive," interpretation and sometimes "progressive development." These 
terms are used interchangeably in this discussion. 
59 The controlling and now classic case is Reparations for Injury Suffered in Service 
of the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 174 (1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 589 (1949). Speaking 
of the United Nations, the Court said, "It must be acknowledged that its Members, by 
entrusting certain functions to it, with the attendant duties and responsibilities, have clothed 
it with the competence required to enable those functions to be effectively discharged.'~ 
I.C.J. Rep. 179 (1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 589 at 592 (1949). To the same point the 
Court added, "Under international law, the Organization must be deemed to have those 
powers which, though not expressly provided in the Charter, are conferred upon it by 
necessary implication as being essential to the performance of its duties.'' I.C.J. Rep. 182 
(1949); 43 AM.. J. INT. L. 595. This definitely marks an acceptance of the liberal view. 
See on this decision, Wright, ''The Jura! Personality of the United Nations,'' 43 AM.. J. 
INT. L. 509 (1949); comment, 48 Mi:cH. L. REv. 496 (1950); Hambro, "A Case of 
Development of International Law Through the International Court of Justice in LA.w AND 
PoLITics IN THB WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 243 (1953). Other cases supporting 
the liberal view include: Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Rep. I at 24 (1949); Competence 
of the International Labour Organization in the Matter of the Regulation of Conditions of 
Work of Persons Employed in Agriculture, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, No. 2 at 9, 1 HuDSON, WoRLD 
CouRT REPORTS 124 (1922); Interpretation of the Treaty of Lausanne, P.C.I.J., Ser. B, 
No. 12 at 6, I HUDSON, WoRLD CoURT REPORTS 722 (1925); dissenting opinions of Judges 
Azevedo and Alvarez in Competence of the General Assembly for Admission of a State 
to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 at 12, 22 (1950). Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 13(l)(a). 
60 See authorities collected in Lauterpacht, "Restrictive Interpretation ' and the Prin-
ciple of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties," 26 BRIT. Y.B. INT. L. 48 (1949); 
Wright, "National Courts and Human Rights-The Fugii Case," 45 AM.. J. INT. L. 62 
(1951). 
61 U.N. Charter, art. 1 (1, 2, 3). 
62 U.N. Charter Preamble; for "principles" implementing the Preamble and the 
PUipOSes of art. 1, see art. 2. 
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Nations as presently constituted could progress to encompass elements 
of government far more extensive than those found in its present 
operating structure. Through a development program one may char-
acterize as "creeping world government," even extreme proposals for 
a legislative power in the General Assembly, powers to tax, to estab-
lish a United Nations police guard, to eliminate the veto, to achieve 
universality of membership and compulsory judicial jurisdiction, may 
find effective implementation when the community is prepared to 
submit to a regime of United Nations law.63 Without the difficul-
ties inherent in the formal amendment process, even such radical 
modifications of the operating structure of the United Nations exist 
as possible developments through interpretation and practice. 
If radical change is thus made legally possible, certainly the modest 
proposals for formal amendment need not perish upon the obstacles 
to that procedure. The doctrine of functional interpretation provides 
a more workable and efficacious technique for modest, pragmatic 
adaptation of the Charter to changed circumstances and aspirations 
of the world community. In even the few years of its existence, the 
Charter has shown considerable B.exibility and capacity to adjust to 
necessary or convenient changes. Of the many available examples 
showing such development, 64 two are chosen for closer examination. 
Two significant impediments to effective application of the United 
Nations have been reduced through interpretation and practice. When 
the United Nations had legal competence to act, the great power 
veto posed an insurmountable hurdle to effective action. The limita-
tion excluding matters "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction" 
of the states concerned posed a second limitation even in the absence 
of frustration by veto. Yet several years practice drastically narrowed 
the effective range of the veto power and all but destroyed the do-
mestic jurisdiction limitation. 
The veto power is simply a requirement that the permanent mem-
bers lodge a concurring vote on all matters of substance in the Security 
63 Taken in its widest application, the concepts of liberal interpretation and "pro-
gressive development," U.N. Charter, art. 13(1)(a), could legally admit of these extreme 
advances in the organization's competence. But only when the political base supporting 
such radical change exists would they become more than mere legal possibilities. Obviously 
the required political climate does not presently exist. 
64 For other examples of development by interpretation and practice, see generally 
GooDRICH AND HAMBRO, CHARTER oP THE UNITED NATIONS (1949); KELsEN, THB LAw 
OP THE UNITED NATIONS (1950); Engel, "De Facto Revision of the Charter of the United 
Nations," 14 J. OP POLITICS 132 (1952); How the United Nations Charter Has Developed, 
Staff Study No. 2, Senate Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, 83d Cong., 2d 
sess. (1954). 
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C01.1~cil.65 No action may be taken without the concurring votes of 
the United Kingdom, France, China, the United States, and the 
Soviet Union. In short the "veto problem," from the standpoint of 
the United States stems from the politics of the USSR combined 
with the Soviet power tq veto measures running against its interests 
or favoring the interests of the western powers. Wide use of the 
Soviet veto in such situations created the "veto problem" and the 
more serious danger that the United Nations would consequently fail 
in its efforts to preserve the peace through a universal concept of 
organization. 66 
The year 1950 brought several changes highlighting interpreta-
tion and practice as workable tools against the veto power. Only the 
fortuitous circumstance of the Soviet representative's absence in the 
Security Council during June and July made the Korea Resolutions 
of those months possible.67 The Council's action determining North 
Korea the aggressor,68 recommending enforcement measures,69 and 
creating the Unified Command70 unquestionably required the con-
curring votes of all permanent members, including the USSR. But 
the Soviet representative being absent, the resolutions lacked the con-
65 The relevant provisions of art. 27 provide as follows: "Decisions of the Security 
Council on procedural matters shall be made by an aflinnative vote of seven members." 
Art. 27(2). "Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an 
aflinnative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; 
provided that, in decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 3 of Article 52, a party 
to a dispute shall abstain from voting." Art. 27(3). The literature on the veto is collected 
in SoHN, CAsEs ON WoRLD LA.w 669 (1950). See JIMINEZ DE AlracHAGA, VOTING AND 
THE HANDLING op DxsPuTEs IN THE SECURITY CoUNCIL (1950); Gross, "The Double 
Veto and the Four-Power Statement on Voting in the Security Council,'' 67 HAitv. L. 
REv. 251 (1953); The Problem of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council, 
Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on the United Nations Charter, Staff Study No. 1, 
83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954). 
66 The ultimate source of the "veto problem" is clearly found in the political relations 
of the U.S. and the USSR. The veto problem is only a legal reflection of the cold war. 
Probably its greatest effect upon the legal structure is found in the development of 
regional and self-defense structures with power to act. without threat of the Soviet veto. 
See van Kle.lfens, ''Regionalism and Political Pacts," 43 AM. J. INT. L. 666 (1949); 
Heindel, Kalijarvi, and Wilcox, ''The North Atlantic Treaty in the United States Senate," 
43 AM. J. INT. L. 633 (1949). Similar reactions of the Soviets gave impetus to security or-
ganizations in Eastern Europe separate from the United Nations. See Kulski, ''The Soviet 
System of Collective Security Compared With the Western System,'' 44 AM.. J. INT. L. 453 
(1950). In both cases the probable frustration of future action by the United Nations led 
to reliance upon an essentially regional rather than a universal concept of security 
organization. 
67 In protest against the continued presence of the Chinese Nationalist representative, 
the Soviet delegation boycotted the United Nations deliberations from January 13, 1950 
to August 1, 1950. See "Enforcing Peace," 9 U.N. BUL. 143, 148, 149 (1950). 
68 Resolution of June 25, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1501. 
69 Resolution of June 27, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1511. 
70 Resolution of July 7, 1950, U.N. Doc. S/1588. 
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curring vote of a permanent member. Nevertheless the resolutions 
were carried and never successfully impeached. On their face, the 
resolutions appear illegal. 71 But their legality may nevertheless be 
demonstrated through an analysis of practice and interpretation. First, 
the inquiry must establish whether the voting formula actually re-
quires a "concurring vote" to avoid the veto. Is any failure to lodge 
a concurring vote a veto? A clear and consistent practice of the 
Council provides a negative response to this question. Prior to the 
Korea Resolutions, at least forty instances of abstention from voting 
are recorded.72 Abstention was never treated as a vote against a 
Council measure; in no instance did the abstention of a great power 
effect a veto. Even as early as August 1947, the then President of 
the Security Council, Mr. F. El-Khouri of Syria, was able to say, 
"I think it is now jurisprudence in the Security Council-and the 
interpretation accepted for a long time-that an abstention is not con-
sidered a veto, and the concurrent votes of the permanent members 
mean the votes of the permanent members who participate in the 
voting. Those who abstain intentionally are not considered to have 
cast a veto. That is quite clear."73 No objections to the President's 
formulation of the rule were recorded in the official records of the 
Council. This inroad on the veto power, in effect interpreting "con-
curring vote" to mean "absence of an express negative vote," was 
adequately confirmed by practice and acquiescence. The opening 
petard once established, it was much easier to deal with the effect of 
b 'b Th" · "· a permanent mem er s a sence. e concurnng vote reqmrement 
reduced to the "no express negative rule," the absolute character of 
the veto was lost. The "abstention" concept provided the category 
in which the "absence problem" was laid to rest. But no clear prac-
tice solved this problem. An absence had not yet been considered 
an "abstention" for veto purposes. Consequently, to treat this ques-
tion of £rst instance, the better approach dwelled heavily upon the 
rule of functional or rational interpretation and progressive develop-
71 The Soviet argument against the legality of the Korea Resolutions is summarized in 
"Enforcing Peace," 9 U.N. BUL. 143 (1950). Should the illegality of the Korea Resolu-
tions be established, then participation in the action by the Unified Command forces could 
violate United Nations Charter, art. 2(4) which obligates members to refrain from the use 
or threat of force in their international relations. See also, Kunz, "Legality of the Security 
Council Resolutions of June 25 and 27, 1950," 45 AM. J. !Nr. L. 137 (1951); KELSBN, 
THE I.Aw OF THE UNITED NATIONS (Supplement 1951). 
72 The practice of abstention in the Security Council is discussed in Liang, "Absten-
tion and Absence of a Permanent Member in Relation to the Voting Procedure in the 
Security Council," 44 AM. J. !Nr. L. 694 at 696 (1950). 
73SEcumTY CoUNcrL OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 2d Year, No. 68 at 1711 (1947). 
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ment. Thus McDougal and Gardner, discussing this concept and 
its application to the veto problem; argued: 'When the march of 
events inevitably lays bare ambiguities and alternatives of interpreta-
tion . . . , even the most modest deference to rationality must re-
quire that interpretation . . . which best promotes the major pur-
poses ... " of the institutions under consideration.74 Applying the 
major purposes of the Charter to this aspect of the veto problem, the 
authors forcefully conclude that absence of a permanent member can-
not frustrate the work of the Security Council.75 To allow one mem-
ber to absent itself and disable the organization is to invite anarchy, 
not fulfillment of the United Nations purpose to maintain and en-
force peace. From the immediate consequences of the Korean epi-
sode, then, two limitations upon the veto were sharpened and de-
veloped. The abstention rule was further established and broadened 
to include the voluntary absence of a permanent member. 
- A third and perhaps more drastic limitation upon the veto in prac-
tice had its origin in thoughts prior to, as well as contemporary with, 
the Korean action. Sometime before the Korean problem arose, the 
threat of a Soviet veto to measures directed against possible Soviet 
aggression, created substantial doubt that the United Nations would 
be able to act against such aggression. Suggestions then appeared 
directing attention to the General Assembly and its- possible role as 
an agency of collective security in the event Council action were frus-
trated by the veto."6 These ideas were sharpened by the Korean epi-
sode and the fortuitous circumstances permitting action without the 
veto in that case. On the correct assumption that the Soviets would 
return to the Security Council to prevent by veto such United Nations 
action in the future, increased attention to the possibilities in the 
General Assembly led to the "Acheson Plan"77 which culminated in 
the General Assembly resolution "Uniting For Peace" of November 
3, 1950.78 
The Uniting for Peace Resolution provides, inter alia, "that if the 
Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the permanent mem-
74 McDougal and Gardner, ''The Veto and the Charter: an Interpretation for Survival," 
60 YALB L.J. 258 at 266 (1951). 
75 Id. at 266, 272. 
76 Hearings (1950) at 415; Bancroft, "Strengthening The United Nations," Pno-
Cl!EDINGS oF THE AM:smCAN SocmTY OF INrBRNATIONAL LAW 149 at 152 (1950); Good-
rich, "Strengthening the United Nations: Maintenance of International Peace and Secur-
ity," id. at 143, 147; Wright, id. at 166. 
77 Acheson, ''The Peace the World Wants," 23 DEPT. OF STATE BUL. 523 at 525 
(1950). . 
78 GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 10 (1950). 
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bers, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where there appears to 
be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression, the 
General Assembly shall consider the matter immediately with a view 
to making appropriate recommendations to the Members for collec-
tive measures, including in the case of a threat to the peace or act 
of aggression, the use of armed force when necessary, to maintain or 
restore international peace and security." Analytical arguments going 
to the validity of "Uniting for Peace" seem generally to favor the 
conclusion that it does not conform to the letter of the 1945 Char-
ter. 79 This is supported by the framer's rather clear assumption that 
in fact only the Security Council would take action involving armed 
force, the Assembly to have authority to operate in the field of peace 
and security but not to the point of recommending to the members 
that they use armed force against an aggressor determined as such by 
the Assembly. While this is not the place to deal with the details 
of analytical argument in this respect, 80 it would seem that the best 
justification for the resolution's legality lies in the progressive de-
velopment concept. Certainly one can argue that the better test of 
legality is furtherance of the purposes and functions of the United 
Nations. If the resolution "Uniting for Peace," by removing the veto 
from situations affecting the peace, does in fact tend to advance the 
organization's effective competence to maintain international peace 
and security, then no analytical complaint can invalidate the resolu-
tion. 81 Thus the principle of functional interpretation has been used 
79 Exclusive authority to determine and deal with threats to the peace was vested in 
the Security Council. See Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the 
United Nations Charter, 79th Cong., 1st sess., S. Ex. Rep. No. 8 (1945). See also the 
arguments of Mr. Vyshinsky in the United Nations, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REc-
ORDs, 5th Year, First Committee, 80, 118, 132 (1950); GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL 
REcoRDs, 5th Year, Plenary Meetings, 324-334 (1950); Km.sEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS 953 (Supplement 1951). 
so Bancroft, "The United Nations as a Collective Security Organization," PnocEED-
INGS OF THE AMERICAN SoCIETY OF brrERNATIONAL LAw 159 (1951); Wright, "Collec-
tive Security in the Light of the Korean Experience," id. at 165; Cohen, "Principles Gov-
erning the Imposition of Sanctions under the United Nations Charter,'' id. at 153; Woolsey, 
"The Uniting for Peace Resolution of the United Nations,'' 45 AM. J. INT. L. 129 (1951). 
81 See remarks of Mr. Gutierrez of Cuba, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs, 5th 
Year, Plenary Meetings, at 321, 323 (1950). Mr. Romulo of the Philippines declared, 
"This authority springs from broad powers of the General Assembly under the Charter, 
from the United Nations inherent right of survival and from its supreme responsibility to 
all the world's peoples to preserve peace. No legal technicality, however brilliantly ad-
vanced, can prevail against the overriding force of this threefold principle," id. at 295. See 
extended argument of Mr. Costa Du Rels of Bolivia and authorities cited, id. at 313 et seq. 
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to expand the competence of the veto-less Assembly, showing the Char-
ter's clear capacity for growth in an area charged with severe political 
consequences and difficulties. 
The second impediment to United Nations action altered mate-
rially through interpretation and practice is the equally familiar· "doc-
trine of domestic jurisdiction." A favorite of theorists for its theo-
retical assumptions and difficulties, the doctrine of domestic juris-
diction has raised similarly difficult problems in application. Article 
2(7)82 of the Charter contains the most recent of many familiar for-
mulas designed to limit the effective sphere of state obligations and 
the competence of international organizations.83 Its primary function 
is to parry the possible thrust of the operating provisions of treaties 
and agreements. This was the purpose of article 2(7) of the Char-
ter. 84 It purported to remove from the United Nations the compe-
tence to intervene in social, economic, civil liberty, immigration, tariff, 
form of government, and similar areas of state concern not ordinarily 
subject to international controls. While other provisions of the Char-
ter give the organization some authority to deal with those matters, 
the reservation of domestic matters in turn revested exclusive authority 
to deal with these questions in the members. Thus limiting the legal 
competence of the United Nations at the outset, the domestic juris-
diction clause alarmed commentators to describe the organization as 
materially disabled by express provisions in its Charter.85 
Experience in practice during the first few years of its existence, 
however, emphatically denies this role for article 2(7). Its intent and 
language to the contrary, the domestic jurisdiction clause is presently 
narrowed to preclude little if any action the organization would other-
wise undertake.86 Over the objections of the Netherlands and the 
82 U.N. Charter, art. 2(7) provides as follows: "Nothing contained in the present 
Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially 
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such 
matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII." 
83 See Preuss, "Art. 2, Paragraph 7 of the Charter of the United Nations and Matters 
of Domestic Jurisdiction," 74 REcuEIL DBS CoURS DB L'ACADBMll! DB DRoIT INr:BRNA-
noNAL 553 (1949). 
84 Gross, "The Charter of the United Nations and the Lodge Reservations," 41 AM. 
J. INT. L. 528, 550 (1947). 
85 Ibid. See Kelsen, ''Limitations on the Functions of the United Nations/' 55 YALB 
L.J. 997 (1946); Eagleton, "United Nations Aims and Structures,'' id. at 974, 979; 
Goodrich, ''The Amount of World Organization Necessary and Possible,'' id. at 950, 964. 
86 Goodrich, "United Nations and Domestic Jurisdiction,'' 3 INT. One. 14, 28 (1949). 
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United Kingdom, the reservation failed to prevent the United Na-
tions from expressing itself on the character of the Franco govern-
ment in Spain.87 Nor did it foreclose the vigorously protested action 
against South Africa in relation to its discriminatory treatment of In-
dian minorities.88 Arguments against the competence of the United 
Nations to deal with the "civil wars" in Indonesia89 and Korea,90 with 
human rights in Africa,91 Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary,92 Tunis and 
Morocco03 have equally failed to prevent United Nations interven-
tion. All of these disputes involved matters probably falling within 
the domestic jurisdiction concept of 1945 broadly construed.04 Com-
petence of the United Nations was in each case vigorously challenged. 
But the challenges were adequately met with argument and principle 
in each instance. Not once did the challenge prevail. 
The key to understanding these disputes and the reconciliation of 
intervention with the broad language of article 2(7) is provided by 
interpretation and practice. The clause itself contains several terms 
flexible enough to admit of narrow construction. If "intervention," 
"essentially," or "domestic jurisdiction" were limited by construction, 
then the effect of the whole article would be contracted. To the ex-
tent the article is contracted, the competence of the United Nations 
is extended. 'IJie concepts selected for this treatment were "essen-
87 JoURNAL OP THB SECURITY CoUNcrr., No. 28 at 549 (April 17, 1946); U.N. 
GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 1st sess., pt. 2 (Resolutions) 63 (1946). 
as See comment, ''The 'Domestic Jurisdiction' Limitation in the United Nations 
Charter," 47 CoL. L. Rav. 268 (1947); Preuss, supra note 83, at 636 et seq. 
B9SEctmITY CoUNCII. OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 2d Year, No. 68 at 1659, 1703 (1947). 
90 Korea Resolutions, supra notes 68-70. With regard to the domestic jurisdiction 
issue see the argument of Mr. Jebb, SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL RBcoRDs, 5th Year, 
No. 28 at 4, 6 (1950). 
01 See Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, 
1952-1953, GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 8th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 31 (1953); 
''Racial Situation in South Africa Reported on by Commission," 15 U.N. BuL. 486 (1953). 
02 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, I.C.J. Rep. 
65, 70 (1950). For a summary of United Nations action with respect to the problem of 
human rights in Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania, see Annual Report of the Secretary-
General on the Work of the Organization, 1950-1951, GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL 
R:scoRDs, 6th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 22 (1951). 
OS Annual Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization 1952-
1953, GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 8th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 35 (1953); 
Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization 1951-1952, 
GBNBRAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL R:scoRDs, 7th sess., Supp. No. 1 at 44 (1952); Howard, 
''The Problems of Tunisia and Morocco in the Seventh Session of the General Assembly," 
28 DEPT. oP STATE BuL. 359 (1953); Dejany, "Competence of the General Assembly in 
the Tunisian-Moroccan Questions," PROCEEDINGS OP THE AMERICAN SoCIETY OP l'Nrmt-
NATIONAL LAW 53 (1953). 
04 For legal arguments supporting a broad construction of the domestic jurisdiction 
reservation, see K:ELsEN, THE LAw OP THE UNITED NATIONS 769 (1950). 
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tially" and "domestic jurisdiction. "95 In most cases, the issue was: 
What attributes force a matter into the concept "essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction" of a state? The results of discussion and de-
cision suggest that only those matters not of "international concern," 
and otherwise domestic, fall within the article. This formulation has 
been expressed in the United Nations debates,96 and provides the 
best rule for reconciling the cases.97 If all matters of "international 
concern" are international and not domestic in character, then article 
2(7) no longer poses an obstacle to an extended United Nations com-
petence. This being true, interpretation and practice have achieved 
a two-fold result. The substance of domestic jurisdiction is rendered 
ineffective against the United Nations action formerly falling within 
95 Although discussion at various times urged a narrow construction of "intervention" 
as well. Preuss, note 83 supra, at 605 et seq. To the framers, "intervention" seemed to 
mean any action by the organization, probably including mere discussion. Report of Sub-
committee B to Committee II/2, 9 U.N. Con£. Doc. 407 (1945). But "intervention" in 
international law means the threat or use of force, at least something like "dictatorial 
interference." 2 LAOTERPACHT, OPPENHBIM's lNrnRNATIONAL LAw, 7th ed., 150 (1952). 
I£ this narrow construction were accepted, then all of the resolutions of the General Assem-
bly challenged on the basis of domestic jurisdiction would be outside of the reservation and 
hence permissible under the Charter. For none involved the use of force. It is suggested, 
however, that the other concepts be broadened for this purpose. A civil war, for example, 
is a domestic matter. It is out of the United Nations jurisdiction unless it falls within chapter 
VII. If it does fall within chapter VII, as a threat to the peace, then the Security Council may 
deal with it in pursuance to its powers under chapter VII. This is an express exception to the 
reservation found in U.N. Charter, art. 2(7). Should the action by the Security Council be 
frustrated by the veto, however, the Assembly may wish to act in pursuance to the Resolution 
"Uniting for Peace,'' GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL RBcoRDs, 5th sess., Supp. No. 20, p. 10 
(1950). Since the express exception of art. 2(7) applies only to the Security Council, 
difficulties confront the Assembly in the domestic civil war situation. If all the advances 
against domestic jurisdiction are written off as a limitation of "intervention," the Assembly 
is "still incompetent to deal forcibly under "Uniting for Peace" against a civil war. The 
Assembly's action would then flatly contradict the reservation of domestic matters. Hence 
the problem is best solved by a construction of "essentially domestic," and a workable 
solution would exempt all matters of "international concern" from the limitation. This 
concept would permit the Assembly to act under the "Uniting for Peace Resolution" where 
an otherwise domestic civil war poses a threat to the peace. 
96 Preuss, note 83 supra, at 627 et seq. Speaking of the character of the Spanish 
Government, the Report of the Security Council Subcommittee on the Spanish Question 
said: "There can be no question that the situation in Spain is of international concern." 
Report of the Subcommittee on the Spanish Question, SECURITY COUNCIL OFFICIAL 
RBcoRDs, 1st Year, 2d Ser. Spec. Supp. at 1 (1946). Mr. Vyshinsky: ''These [domestic 
matters] are not matters which have an international character; these are not matters which 
concern international relations." GENERAL AssEMBLY OFFICIAL RBcoRDs (Plenary Meet-
ings) Pt. 2, 1041, 1043 (1946). Cf. statement of Mr. Lodge to the General Committee 
of the Eighth General Assembly: "The United States has observed with increasing concern 
the tendency of the General Assembly to place on its agenda subjects the international 
character of which is doubtful .••• The United States holds that this problem deserves 
most careful consideration by all member governments in preparing for the Charter Review 
Conference." RBvmw OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER (Documents) 83d Cong., 2d 
sess., Doc. No. 87 at 283 (1954). But see Hearings (1954) at 56. 
97 Discussion note 95 supra. 
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article 2(7). One impediment to the use of progressive development 
techniques is removed. The fully sovereign character of the member 
states thus substantially reduced, even less support remains for a "sov-
ereignty" based conception supporting a restrictive view of Charter 
interpretation generally.98 Hence it may be concluded that interpre-
tation and practice is an effective method for creating change in a 
legal structure such as the Charter. Already the veto and domestic 
jurisdiction limitations are substantially reduced. These developments 
made possible in security and other areas of intense political interest, 
then surely the remaining impediments to forceful action in the United 
Nations may be removed by the same method. 
Difficulties nevertheless remain. The concept of development by 
interpretation and practice may raise questions associated with the 
customary law of nations. As customary international law suffers from 
an inability to effect rapid change in the context of a clear tradition of 
customary law and the inability to erect new organizational forms, so 
these objections may be raised against development of the United Na-
tions through practice. For example, the International Court of Justice 
has upheld the veto power on applications for membership.99 The 
Court has missed an opportunity to extend its compulsory jurisdiction 
by dicta suggesting the Court would refuse to take jurisdiction when 
the only evidence of consent consists of a Security Council resolution 
recommending that the parties submit their dispute to the Court.100 
These rules being supported more or less by practice and judicial deci-
sion, it may be doubted that they can be overcome through interpreta-
tion and practice. The second objection goes to the possibility of 
erecting a new structure by interpretation. How, for example, can 
98 Notes 57, 59 supra. 
99 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United 
Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 4 (1950). 
lOO Corfu Channel Case (Preliminary Objection), I.C.J. Rep. 15 at 26 (1947-1948). 
The Court's jurisdiction rests upon consent of litigants. Statute of the International Court 
of Justice, art. 36. It may be expressed, however, in various ways. For a collection of 
materials bearing on the consent requirement to the World Court's jurisdiction in conten-
tious cases see HAMI!no, THE CASE LAw OF THE lNrBRNATIONAL CotmT 321 et seq. 
(1952); HunsoN, THE PERMANENT CotmT OF lNrBRNATIONAL JusncE 405-482 (1942); 
LisSITZYN, THE lNr.ERNATIONAL CotmT OF JusncE 61-71 (1951). In the Corfu Channel 
Case, supra, the Court took jurisdiction on other evidence of consent but did not consider 
the Security Council Resolution recommending to the Albanian government and the United 
Kingdom that they refer the case to the Court. Despite the provision of art. 36(1) that 
"the jurisdiction of the Court comprises • • • all matters specially provided for in the 
Charter of the United Nations," a concurring minority held that acceptance of the Charter 
by the members did not express their consent for the Council to make a binding recom-
mendation vesting jurisdiction in the Court. Cf. U.N. Charter, art. 36(1, 3); Corfu 
Channel Case (Preliminary Objection), at 31; Hudson, "The Twenty-Sixth Year of the 
World Court," 42 AM. J. INT. L. 1 (1948). 
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practice and custom create an International Criminal Court? Institu-
tions like courts do not ordinarily appear without an organic instru-
ment. How then could the gradual method of interpretation meet the 
need for the creation of new institutions ab initio? How can effective 
restraints and safeguards be placed against the institutions like the 
proposed International Criminal Court? 
Both central objections to the process of development by interpre-
tation and practice ignore the character of basic institutions already 
established under the Charter. The World Court, Security Council, 
and General Assembly are already working institutions. Through de-
velopment and application, these established iµstitutions, particularly 
the General Assembly, could provide adequate solutions to the prob-
lems of overcoming existing practice and erecting new institutions. 
Accordingly, the Assembly could revise the jurisdiction requirements 
of the World Court1°1 and undertake to admit new members to the 
organization without a favorable recommendation of the Security 
Council.102 Similarly, the proposed criminal court could be established 
by resolution of the Assembly without unanimous consent of the 
members.103 Indeed the views of the American member of the Special 
Committee charged with drafting a statute for such a court suggested 
General Assembly action as part of a plan for implementing the pro-
posed statute.104 Should the Assembly adopt this procedure for creating 
new institutions, adequate safeguards and limitations may be worked 
into the proposal and implementing resolutions.105 Hence an increased 
emphasis upon the powers of the Assembly suggests the general direc-
tion for development making possible the changes necessary to success-
101 U.N. Charter, arts. IO, 13. Cf. generally Sloan, ''The Binding Force of a 'Recom-
mendation' of the General Assembly of -the United Nations," 25 BruT. Y.B. !Nr. L. 1 
(1948). 
102 See dissenting opinions of Judges Alvarez and Azevedo, Competence of the General 
Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations, I.C.J. Rep. 12, 22 (1950); 
statement of Mr. Vieyra, Argentine representative, in the Ad Hoc Political Committee on 
the Admission of New Members (mimeograph, 1953). 
103 Legal arguments going to the Assembly's competence to establish an independent 
judicial body are discussed in ''International Criminal Jurisdiction," 15 U.N. BUL. 193 
(1953); Liang, ''The Establishment of an International Criminal Jurisdiction: The Second 
Phase," 47 AM. J. !Nr. L. 638 (1953); Wright, "Proposal for an International Criminal 
Court," 46 AM. J. INT. L. 60 (1952); Liang, ''Establishment of an International Criminal 
Jurisdiction: First Phase," id. at 73. · 
104 ''International Criminal Jurisdiction," 15 U.N. BUL. 193 (1953). 
105 Safeguards are of course provided in the Revised Draft Statute for an International 
Criminal Court, adopted by the 1953 Special Committee on International Criminal Juris-
diction, id. at 196. Cf. Finch, ''Draft Statute for an International Criminal Court," 46 AM. 
J. !Nr. L. 89 (1952). 
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ful realization of the purposes of the United Nations.106 In the event 
the General Assembly's functions thus find emphasis and application, 
difficulties associated with customary international law raise no whole-
sale inhibitions to further growth through interpretation and practice. 
It is pot therefore unreasonable to posit the gradual technique of 
interpretation and practice as the preferable legal basis for effective 
change. That method is shown to be more than a mere concept; it is 
a working tool of international life. It has reformulated and limited 
drastically the practical effect of the veto; it has confined if not destroyed 
the jurisdictional limits of domestic matters. Its use within the context 
of existing institutions of the United Nations evidences a utility beyond 
that associated with customary growth in the law of nations generally. 
Legal difficulties accordingly fail to emerge as effective inhibitions to 
the process of progressive development by interpretation and practice. 
While progressive development has limitations, these are political 
rather than legal in character. Assuming that the legal difficulties 
discussed above may be readily overcome, the remaining obstacle to 
efficient change is essentially a political matter. Asking what the com-
munity desires in terms of change and growth, the political limitations 
are altogether proper. They would and should limit change by any 
other device as well as progressive development. The problem thus 
reduced to politics, the burden of change shifts to the political commu-
nity. If the community's desires and needs cannot be effected within 
the formal structure of the existing organization, then development of 
the sense of community, not formal amendment of the Charter is 
106This may require less emphasis upon recourse to the World Court for advisory 
opinions on matters of competence. Since the legal question of competence is so thoroughly 
political in inception and consequence, the process of decision by the political organ imme-
diately concerned may be preferable. Thus Mr. Vyshinsky, speaking to the domestic 
jurisdiction issue in the African Human Rights dispute before the General Assembly said: 
"The Soviet delegation considers that justice must indeed be secured and it should be secured 
by an international court; but this international court is here, it is yourselves, it is all of us, 
it is our Organization which should deliver its verdict. This is what we want, this is what 
we demand." GENERAL Assl!MBLY OFFICIAL REcoRDs (Plenary Meetings) Pt. 2, 1041, 1045 
(1946). This was apparently the view of the framers. "In the course of the operations 
from day to day of the various organs of the Organization, it is inevitable that each organ 
will interpret such parts of the Charter as are applicable to its particular functions. This 
process is inherent in the functioning of any body which operates under an instrument de-
fining its functions and powers." Report of Committee IV/2, 13 U.N. Con£. Doc. 703 at 
709 (1945). See panel discussion, "Strengthening the United Nations," Pnocl!l!DINGS OP 
nm AMERICAN SocmTY oP OOERNATIONAL LA.w 141, 164 (1950). Cf. id. at 158-159. 
For a different side of this problem see Gross, "States as Organs of International Law and the 
Problem of Autointerpretation" in LA.w AND PoLl'I'lcs IN nm WoRLD CoMMUNITY, Lipsky 
ed., 59 (1953). Compare Kunz, "The United Nations and the Rule of Law," 46 AM. J. 
!Nr. L. 504 (1952); Eagleton, "The United Nations: A Legal Order?" in LA.w AND PoLl'I'ICS 
IN nm WoRLD COMMUNITY, Lipsky ed., 129 (1953); Cowles, "Revision of the United 
Nations Charter and the Development of Law," 33 NEB. L. REv. 35 (1953). 
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required. To argue formal amendment in this context is to assume a 
revolutionary change in the attitudinal and political structure of the 
world community, an assumption at best utopian, at worst divisive and 
destructive. If the community is prepared to revise the basic organiza-
tion for control of international life, this need not be attempted through 
formal amendment of the Charter; it can be properly and promptly 
effected through progressive development of the existing structure. 
V. Legal Techniques and Policy Goals as Interrelated 
Problems in Charter Revision 
These concluding observations assume that change is both neces-
sary and resolutely desired by a preponderant majority of United Na-
tions members. The substance of specific change is ordinarily left to 
determination through the international political process. Legal method 
has as its task the delimitation of techniques available for implementing 
specific proposals for change. Yet policy and method combine to pre-
sent a galaxy of mixed problems of interaction between law and poli-
tics. Each has its unavoidable and material effect upon the other. 
Therefore, it may be assumed that, change being desired, the ultimate 
choice of technique involves a balancing of specific means, a weighing 
of advantages against disadvantages to the whole scheme of possible 
developments under consideration. Thus any treatment of goals with-
out reference to legal means leaves one material part of the problem of 
change unsolved. 
Revolutionary techniques survive analysis as legally possible but 
politically improbable methods. Rebus sic stantibus and the doctrine 
of prior breach seem to argue too much. Like the notion of withdrawal 
from the United Nations, these drastic devices require destructiop of 
the whole concept of world organization in order to achieve even lim-
ited and modest change. As unrealistic possibilities, they may be 
accordingly excluded from further consideration. . 
If the extremes of renunciation are to be avoided, so must the com-
peting extreme method of revolutionary displacement. While this 
device remains equally available as a legal possibility, there is little 
evidence that favorable opinion sufficient to warrant a drastic increase 
in the function of world organization exists. To emphasize the need 
for such revolutionary extensions of organizational structures implicit 
in Atlantic Union or World Federation serves only to divert attention 
from the less dramatic but more meaningful possibilities for modest 
change within the existing United Nations framework. 
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If organizational change is to be effected through the international 
political process, moreover, it may be urged that revision by the tech-
nique of formal amendment be approached cautiously if not entirely 
avoided.107 While it may be contended that change by subordinate 
agreement remains a possibility worthy of considerable exploration, 
proposals for formal amendment tend to inhibit the process of change 
by interpretation and political accommodation.108 Since the formal 
amendment process seems doomed to frustration at the outset, it remains 
to examine the interrelations of amendment and practice. 
One of the principal difficulties inherent in the amendment process 
centers upon the admissions it may imply. To propose a drastic amend-
ment· is to admit that its substance is presently unlawful under the 
Charter or general international law. Otherwise, it could be argued, 
the amendment would not be necessary or desirable. To propose, for 
example, that the veto be removed from pacific settlement or member-
ship matters is to admit that the veto power presently applies to those 
matters. Such admissions, it is submitted, serve only to increase the 
impediments to progressive development. If such far-reaching amend-
ments fail of ratification, a clear certainty at this juncture, then the net 
result of pressing for amendment is negative from the standpoint of 
development along the lines proposed in the amendments. 
If the amendment process is thus self-defeating from the legal pro-
gressive development standpoint, it tends also to inhibit the process of 
gradual political adjustment. For the West to urge its proposals upon 
the organization will require the USSR to select one of several alterna-
tive policies. Since the Soviet intransigence with respect to amend-
ment matters is a known factor, it may be assumed that the USSR will 
not acquiesce in farreaching proposals offered by the West. If the 
USSR is embarrassed and isolated by amendment proposals, it might 
in tum offer amendments to embarrass the West. Choosing to avoid 
these possibilities, Soviet policy could totally ignore the amendment 
activity or initiate a further withdrawal from international cooperation. 
In any case the likelihood of intensified political disunity is clear. 
Failing of ultimate ratification, the amendments would doubtless serve 
107 See Gross, "Revising the Charter," 32 FonmcN AFFAIRS 203 (Jan. 1954). The 
possibility that Charter review and amendment would endanger the organization's structure 
as it presently exists was recognized by Secretary Dulles, Hearings (1954) at 6, 9, and 
Ambassador Lodge, id. at 37. 
108 But Secretary Dulles thought, " ••• it may be found practical to solidify practices 
which involve effective working of the charter which will overcome many of the defects 
which are now found in it, from an operating standpoint." Hearings (1954) at 10. The 
contrary view is discussed in Morgenthau, "The New United Nations and the Revision of 
the Charter," 16 REvmw OF PoLrTics 3 at 16 (1954). 
68 MrcmGAN LAw RBvmw [ Vol. 53 
merely to increase international tensions and decrease the areas of 
effective international communication. To the extent these results 
impair gradual adjustments in the east-west conHict, the amendment 
process would again appear self-defeating. 
Seri_ous thought about developing the United Nations ought thus 
to consider the problem as one much broader than mere formal amend-
ment. Caution may be necessary where the veto is expected. In other 
areas, where prior agreement with the Soviet Union may be reached, 
caution based on these assumptions may be unnecessary. Yet the veto 
danger areas seem to call for a reticent approach to revision by amend-
ment. If reticence enlarges the future possibility of progressive devel-
opment and political adjustment, protection of those interests should 
outweigh the dramatic advantages of the amendment process. From 
the standpoint of United Nations interests, enthusiasm resulting from 
an amendment campaign may not favorably balance the divisive results 
in the sphere of gradual political adjustment and organizational growth. 
Since the gradual approach rests upon the extensive and unexhausted 
capacity of the organization to adjust itself to gradual changes in the 
community, it should not be hastily threatened by the pursuit of impos-
sible but attractive formal amendments. As the world community 
gradually seeks a system of order by extending its organizational struc-
ture· through practice, drastic methods might be avoided if the United 
Nations is to absorb the community's growth and function as an accept-
able regulator of international politics. 
